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I.Letter from the President Chair

Esteemed delegates,

I am more than honored to be serving as President Chair during the conference. I am Selin Karan and I welcome all of our delegates of the UNSC committee with great honor. By this way, we aim to organize our participants a Model United Nations conference that will stick in their minds with the help of our lovely Secretary General Sude Zalođlu. I would like to say that we are eagerly awaiting the first day of our conference to meet with you and to give you an experience that you will never forget. Before ending my letter I would like to thank other academic team members who gave me a chance to be the President Chair of this committee that aims to improve every delegates' debating skills and their solution-based vision. I believe the committee, me and my hard working committee board members İnci Bakırlı prepared will be efficient for every delegates participant in order them to develop themselves as committee based on solutions which means delegates will consider just like diplomats. I will always be ready to help and if you have any questions about the committee or procedure, you can contact me via selinkaran12@gmail.com .As President Chair, I wish you all the best for HOMEMUN'20

Sincerely,

President Chair, Selin KARAN

II-Introduction to the Committee

For six years, the United States has ineffectively confronted Iran over its nuclear program. Bush administration officials had several opportunities to constrain, perhaps even end, programs that could eventually give Iran a nuclear-weapons capability, but they rejected negotiations in favor of efforts to replace the ruling clerical regime. These efforts failed. Iran now believes that it grows stronger while the United States grows weaker. U.S. entanglement in Iraq, the global addiction to oil, and the difficulties of building and sustaining a credible diplomatic coalition against Iran's budding nuclear program have emboldened Tehran and hardened the country's determination to proceed with its uranium enrichment efforts, which could produce not just fuel for reactors but fuel for bombs. Iran's government has exploited both the Iraq war and the international dispute over its nuclear development efforts to create rifts between the United States and our essential security partners. In the process, Iran's clerical regime has broadened its regional influence, and in some ways strengthened its rule at home. The Bush administration has responded primarily by ratcheting up financial and military pressures, but has failed to change Iranian policy. The administration's recent actions and rhetoric paint a disturbing picture of a president preparing for war with Iran. The United States has every right to protect its forces in Iraq and the region.

U.S. military action that strays beyond these limited objectives, however, could harden Iran's nuclear ambitions and give ammunition to those within the Iranian regime who say that nuclear weapons capabilities are the only way to safeguard their country. There is little reason for Americans to have confidence in the Bush administration's failed strategy for dealing with Iran. Its counter-proliferation and democracy-promotion strategies, heralded as fundamental breaks from the policies of the previous decades, have proved disastrous. The Iranian nuclear program has accelerated over the past six years, while other proliferation problems have worsened across the board. A more effective approach is urgently needed. This report offers a new way forward. We identify five basic U.S. policy options for dealing with Iran's nuclear program, none of which offers an assured path to success. The options are:

1. Maintain the status quo of "muddling through."
2. Non-military efforts to replace the current regime.
3. Military attacks on known Iranian nuclear facilities.
4. A "grand bargain."
5. Decisive diplomacy to roll back Iran's nuclear programs.

No simple solution exists for solving the Iranian nuclear problem. By rejecting the obviously flawed options, however, and then conducting a sober appraisal of the possible, we are left with our best available option: decisive diplomacy to contain and engage Iran. This option boasts a number of interrelated policy proposals that we believe can achieve our core objective—the negotiated end of Iran's nuclear enrichment program—within 12 to 18 months. The contain-and-engage strategy offers

the best chance of testing Iran's interest in trading away any future nuclear-weapons capability for present security and economic benefits that would accrue to the vast majority of the Iranian people. At the same time, the strategy lays the groundwork for more effectively containing Iran should the country's divided ruling elites still press ahead with its nuclear enrichment program. The strategy will also help illustrate to the Iranian people and the world that the United States tried to resolve our dispute with the clerics. But first, what's wrong with the first four options? This paper will explore in detail all five options, but briefly, here's why we ultimately rejected the first four. The first option, to "muddle through," is often the default option in national security policy, particularly when deep divisions exist within a government. This is a policy with no clear The contain-and-engage strategy couples the pressures created by sanctions and coercive diplomacy with practical compromises and realizable security assurances to maximize the chances that Iran strategic vision on how to employ the tools of American power—political, economic, and military—to achieve a common objective. Alas, "muddling through" is the current approach of the Bush administration. Divisions within the Bush administration have produced major strategic missteps in U.S. policy towards Iran, contributing to a worsening nuclear crisis and expanding Iranian influence in both Iraq and Afghanistan at the expense of America. Partial measures, whether negative, such as the sanctions imposed by the U.S. Treasury Department, or positive, such as the endorsement of economic incentives offered by the European Union, are unlikely to convince Iran to abandon uranium enrichment. The second option, to pursue regime change through democracy promotion and other non-military means, is unlikely to fundamentally change the character of the clerical government under the Iranian constitution. Direct U.S. aid or sponsorship of anti-government groups in Iran could fatally damage those group's credibility, weakening the indigenous forces for reform and retarding a genuine change of the regime. And even if such a change were to occur), there is no guarantee that a democratically accountable government would renounce Iran's nuclear programs. The third option, to conduct military strikes against Iran's known nuclear facilities, is the option least likely to achieve U.S. national security objectives. The United States could not assume that air strikes would buy anything more than a few years' delay in Iran's nuclear enrichment program. It is unlikely that the United States and its partners could use this delay to end Iran's nuclear program. Military strikes would likely consolidate support for an otherwise unpopular government, provoke a variety of asymmetrical military responses that could develop into a sustained war with Iran, and trigger global economic and political repercussions highly detrimental to American global security interests. This option is the worst of the lot. The fourth option, to negotiate a "grand bargain" with Iran, is not practical. It would require the simultaneous resolution of too many other U.S.-Iranian conflicts to achieve the most important objective—the negotiated end of Iran's nuclear enrichment program. We agree with the vision of a "grand bargain" outlined by Middle East expert and former Bush administration official Flynt Leverett, who argues (beginning on page 33) that the resolution of the nuclear issue requires "an overarching framework in which outstanding bilateral differences are resolved as a package."² Neither the Bush administration nor the governing coalition in Iran, however, is capable of making the sweeping changes required by this strategy in the near term. Moreover, the issues of Iran's involvement in Iraq, its support for Hezbollah and Hamas, its hostility towards es the pressures created by sanctions and coercive diplomacy with practical compromises and realizable security assurances to maximize the chances that Iran abandons its nuclear ambitions. Israel, and its human rights record can and should be pursued on independent tracks from the nuclear issue. Iran's nuclear enrichment program is by far the most urgent issue and it alone has the attention of the UN Security Council and the leverage that brings. By holding this issue hostage to the resolution of all issues, the

grand bargain strategy risks failure to resolve any of them. That's why we believe our final option, to simultaneously contain and engage Iran, offers the best possibility of moving toward a broader agreement with concrete, reciprocal measures based on the principle that would underlie any grand bargain—recognition that the United States must address Iranian security concerns in exchange for Iran addressing ours. The contain-and-engage strategy offers the best hope for slowing Iran's nuclear efforts, testing Iran's willingness to trade nuclear weapons capabilities in exchange for a fundamentally different relationship with the United States, and hedging against the failure of diplomatic efforts. The chief goal of this policy is to end Iran's uranium enrichment program. The strategy recognizes that progress towards this goal is unlikely without progress on the overall U.S.-Iranian relationship, the development of regional security arrangements and the creation of a mechanism for assuring a steady supply of nuclear fuel to Iran and other nations. Our strategy, however, is not a longterm, comprehensive strategy for resolving all the issues that separate the U.S. and Iran. Rather, it focuses on the near-term challenge of constraining Iran's nuclear program so that the most dangerous aspect of that program— uranium enrichment—can be curtailed. The reason: If Iran's enrichment program is not delayed over the next two years, Iran's nuclear engineers may achieve a level of self-sufficiency to enable them to hide their activities from international inspectors and national intelligence agencies far more effectively. This could undermine the balance of power in the region and the viability of the global nonproliferation regime. Conversely, constraining Iran's nuclear program would create the necessary time to work toward resolving a broader range of issues with Iran and shore up global efforts to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. Thus, U.S. policy should look to implement a series of measures that could contain the Iranian nuclear program and minimize Iran's regional influence. We should complement these containment efforts with sufficient diplomatic openings to engage pragmatic members of Iran's ruling elite and appeal to the broad masses of the Iranian public in order to isolate and weaken the radical revolutionary elements represented by President Mohammed Ahmadinejad. Key elements of this policy include: n

Isolating Iran as long as it continues with its nuclear enrichment efforts;

Preserving the unity of the UN Security Council and other nations engaged in negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program;

Maintaining international and national sanctions, however limited, for the pressure they bring on the Iranian economy;

Restricting Iran's access to nuclear and missile technologies; n Breaking the diplomatic stalemate over Iran's defiance of the Security Council's demand to suspend enrichment, including direct dialogue with Iran;

Investing in new diplomatic infrastructure, both security- and nonproliferation-related, across the Middle East in order to engage and contain Iran and to provide assurances to key U.S. allies that the United States remains committed to their security;

Preparing smart military options to thwart any offensive Iranian military activities;

Engaging Iran economically, beginning with the gasoline refinery sector;

Creating a regional nuclear fuel bank consortium under IAEA leadership;

Laying the diplomatic groundwork for a long-term strategy of containing Iran should negotiations break down. In short, the international community must constantly remind Iran of the potential benefits as well as the continued and escalating costs of its failure to comply with its nonproliferation obligations. Rather than pursue the faint hope that the organization of coercive measures will force Iran's capitulation, our contain-and-engage strategy couples the pressures created by sanctions, diplomatic isolation and investment freezes with practical compromises and realizable security assurances to encourage Iran onto a verifiable, non-nuclear weapons path. As our report will make clear, a technical assessment of Iran's nuclear development program alongside a fundamental understanding of the complex political dynamics within that country point inexorably toward our approach as the best U.S. national security option available. There is no guarantee of success, but without making the effort, we face guaranteed failure.

Iran's Nuclear Program:

A Technical Assessment

Any effort to control Iran's nuclear program must be informed by an accurate technical assessment that identifies what we do and do not know, along with "wildcards" that could accelerate or delay the program. Misjudging the nature of the threat will lead to strategies that either overreach or under react. The Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Fuel for Energy Reactors or Bombs Uranium enrichment involves two basic steps: acquiring the feedstock for uranium enrichment, uranium hexafluoride (UF₆), and then spinning the UF₆ in gaseous form at super-sonic speed in centrifuges.³ This process separates U-235, the isotope of uranium used in the explosive core of a nuclear weapon, from U-238, the far more common isotope comprising 99 percent of natural uranium. Uranium enriched to three percent to five percent U-235 is used for fuel rods, and is known as low-enriched uranium (LEU); uranium enriched to 70 to 90 percent U-235 is used for bombs, and is considered highly enriched uranium (HEU).⁴ Additionally, when low-enriched uranium fuel is burned in a nuclear energy reactor, some of the uranium is converted into plutonium, the other material used in nuclear bombs.

This plutonium can be separated from the spent fuel using specialized plutonium separation facilities. As the accompanying diagram shows, a country need not assemble and test a nuclear weapon to derive many of the perceived benefits of having a weapon. Developing the industrial complex necessary to enrich uranium or separate plutonium, as we explain in our analysis of the implications of Iran's program for U.S. national security on page 24, can convey national prestige or generate regional fears. This technology can produce fuel for nuclear power reactors or the explosive core of a nuclear weapon. The Non-Proliferation Treaty, or NPT, does not prohibit countries that have signed onto the treaty from making and holding weapons-grade material, provided these activities are exclusively—and in good faith—for peaceful purposes and the material is under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. The IAEA, for instance, polices some civilian research reactors that use highly enriched uranium for fuel. The History and Politics of Iran's Nuclear Program in Brief Iran's nuclear efforts began in the 1960s under the late Shah Reza Pahlavi. After a brief interruption during the 1979 revolution that ushered in the current clerical regime, the new Islamic Republic restarted the country's nuclear efforts in the early 1980s in the midst of Iran's eight-year

war with Iraq. Although the new government began acquiring design information and technical assistance for the construction of uranium conversion facilities and centrifuges from China and Pakistan beginning in the mid-1980s, the program for the enrichment of uranium has proceeded very slowly, not least because of steep technical challenges. This program proceeded alongside the public program to construct a 1,000-megawatt power reactor at Bushehr with Russian assistance.⁵ Iran also began another previously secret program that could give it the ability to reprocess, or extract, the plutonium produced by this and other reactors. Iran's nuclear enrichment program was also constrained by a combination of weak government revenues (as oil prices fell precipitously during the 1990s) and uneven support within Iran's governing elite. Beginning around 1999-2000, however, the Iranian

government began advanced engineering and development work for its secret uranium enrichment program, driven initially by a combination of increased government revenues (as oil prices rose) and a growing desire for regional dominance. These efforts were fed thereafter by U.S. threats of regime change and domestic politics.⁶ Iran's influence in the Middle East began to grow beginning in late 2003, as the insurgency in Iraq began to metastasize. The U.S. had eliminated two of Iran's regional rivals, the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2001 and Saddam Hussein in Iraq in 2003. In the intervening years, the Iranian regime actively cooperated with the United States in Afghanistan but felt increasingly threatened by U.S. rhetoric, including President Bush's 2002 State of the Union labeling Iran—along with Iraq and North Korea— part of an "axis of evil." In early 2003, the Iranian regime indicated a willingness to negotiate an end to its support for Hezbollah, its opposition to the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, and possibly its nuclear program. An April 2003 proposal from Iran detailed a road map for resolving these differences. The Bush administration ignored Iran's overtures and key officials, including then-National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, now claim they never saw the Iranian proposal.⁷ As the insurgency in Iraq began to mount in 2004-2005, however, some in Iran lost interest in negotiating, as they perceived an opportunity to advance Iran's influence in the region at the expense of the United States. Iran's confidence grew in the aftermath of the Israeli-Lebanese conflict in the summer of 2006. These developments have contributed to a growing consensus among Iranian elites that mastering uranium enrichment could enable Iran to achieve several key goals of paramount importance. These include deterring U.S. interference in Iran's internal affairs, consolidating regional dominance, and sustaining Iranian nationalism and support for the current regime.

The Plutonium Route to a Bomb

In order to produce plutonium for a bomb, Iran must acquire a nuclear reactor, which produces plutonium in the fuel rods, and a specialized plant for extracting the plutonium from the spent fuel. Iran is building a 40 MW heavy-water nuclear reactor complex at Arak. A heavy-water reactor uses natural uranium as fuel (bypassing the need to enrich the uranium) and produces more plutonium more quickly than other reactors. Iran claims the reactor is for civilian nuclear research. In August 2006, Iran opened a plant at Arak for producing "heavy water" that would be used to cool the planned reactor. The reactor itself is scheduled for completion in 2009, but it is highly unlikely to meet that deadline. The light-water reactor at Bushehr being built with Russian assistance would

offer Iran another alternative for acquiring plutonium. That reactor, if and when it is completed in the second half of 2007, will use low-enriched uranium fuel leased from the Russians. As part of its arrangement with Russia, however, Iran must also return the spent fuel to Russia. To extract the plutonium from either source, Iran would have to build a reprocessing plant that uses chemical processes to separate plutonium from the spent fuel. Iran has told the IAEA that it has no plans to build such a facility; such a facility would be very difficult for Iran to hide.

Understanding the Adversary: Political Dynamics in Iran

The United States cannot craft an effective Iran policy without a nuanced understanding of Iran's factionalized domestic politics. Internal politics shape Iran's foreign policy decision-making, including over its nuclear program, and consequently shape both Iran's response to efforts by the United States and its partners to constrain the program and Iran's behavior should it succeed in mastering uranium enrichment.¹⁵ The United States has the economic, military, and political leverage to shape Iran's decisions, but it won't be easy. Iran's competing political factions make it very difficult to tell what the "true" Iranian position is amid the infighting. Those internal disputes can drag out decision-making and leave dissatisfied factions capable of sabotaging commitments made by the leadership. In addition, some influential factions view economic incentives with suspicion, are convinced that Iran does not need productive relations with the West in order to survive, and conclude that Iran can weather economic and political sanctions short of total isolation. Other factions would welcome a more productive relationship with the West, and indeed see it as a prerequisite for the survival of the Islamic Republic. This does not mean that negotiating with Iran is futile. Rather, the United States has to be prepared for a difficult dialogue. Neither Dictatorship Nor Democracy Iran is neither a dictatorship, like Kim Jong Il's North Korea or Iraq under Saddam Hussein, nor a Western-style democracy. "The Iranian Revolution of

1978-1979," according to Nikki Keddie, Professor Emeritus at the University of California-Los Angeles, "united several groups, classes, and parties with disparate ideas who were against the old regime" of Shah Reza Pahlavi.¹⁶ The factions were not united, however, in their vision for the new Iranian state, relations with the West, and the role of religion. The outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war in 1980 enabled the charismatic Ayatollah Ruholla Khomeini to consolidate his vision of a theocratic state. Some factions were accommodated in his theocratic state; others were violently excluded.¹⁷ Today, Iran is a hybrid of more than a dozen unelected and elected institutions and actors that compete for power, influence, and the popular support of the Iranian people. These actors use a combination of Islamic ideology, nationalism, and, at times, violence to achieve their objectives. The authority of these institutions often overlaps and the government does not always speak publicly with one voice, so it is not always clear which entities are guiding policy.¹⁸ The result of this ideological factionalization, as Council on Foreign Relations scholar Ray Takeyh puts it, is that "Iran's foreign policy has always been characterized by a degree of inconsistency and wild oscillation between pragmatism and dogma."¹⁹ This does not mean, however, that Iran's leaders are irrational. There are patterns discernable by examining the two main poles that define the spectrum of political views among the ruling elite in Iran—hardliners and pragmatists, as well the country's weakened, more moderate reformist faction. The hardliner faction is traditionally composed of conservative clerics, so-called bazzari merchants, and the Islamic charitable foundations known as bonyads—all of whom, for different reasons, are strongly opposed to foreign economic or social inroads into the country (see details, page 18) Hardliners dominate a number of key governmental institutions, such as the judiciary, the

Revolutionary Guards, and the Guardian Council. Iran's president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is an upstart hardliner, but some of his policies—particularly in the economic realm— are controversial among the established members of the hardliner faction. The Economist Intelligence Unit reports that establishment hardliners have “frustrated aspects of [Ahmadinejad's] economic program.”

The pragmatist faction is led by Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, president of Iran from 1989 to 1997 and currently the chairman of the Expediency Council, an influential advisory body to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei. A cleric by training, Rafsanjani ran again for President in 2005 but lost to Ahmadinejad. Rafsanjani's views on foreign policy and economic issues broadly align with those of the reformist faction that rose to prominence under President Mohammad Khatami, who served from 1997 to 2005.²¹ The reformist faction, disorganized and lacking a charismatic leader of its own, is currently shut out of government. Hence, hardliners and pragmatists define the main political poles of Iran's government.

What Iranians Think Key finding of recent public opinion polls The goal of eventually eliminating all nuclear weapons: 68 percent of Iranians in favor; 18 percent were opposed. Having a nuclear weapons free zone in the Middle East that would include both Islamic countries and Israel: 71 percent in favor; 18 percent opposed. Importance of Iran developing a full fuel-cycle nuclear program: 91 percent very or somewhat important; 4 percent not important. View of Osama Bin Laden: 74 percent unfavorable (including 68 percent very unfavorable); 10 percent favorable. Influence of the United Nations in the world: 58 percent mainly positive influence; 24 percent mainly negative influence.

Threat of Iran's neighbors developing nuclear weapons: 76 percent view as a critical or important threat; 15 percent not a threat. Existing nuclear weapons states “actively work together toward eliminating nuclear weapons” as required by the Non Proliferation Treaty: 6 percent yes; 82 percent no. Likelihood that the U.S. will take military action against Iran's nuclear facilities in the next year or two: 48 percent somewhat or very likely; 45 percent not at all or not very likely. A military confrontation between Iran and the United States is likely to occur within the next ten years: 28 percent yes, 39 percent no, 20 percent neutral, 14 percent did not answer.

Source: “Public Opinion in Iran and America on Key International Issues.”